What does “a probability of 1/6” mean?
The bench holds three dice, A, B and C, and one of them has been chosen in secret to be loaded. On that one a six comes up once in three throws, and each of the other faces twice in fifteen. Each click throws all three dice together, and the histograms show the fraction of throws on which each face came up, beside a dashed line at 1/6. After ten throws the three histograms usually look equally lopsided, and a fair die showing three or four sixes is nothing unusual.
The line at 1/6 comes from no throw at all. It comes from looking at a well-made die and finding no reason to favour one face over another, and six faces with no favourite split the total into six equal shares. What that fraction promises is a proportion over many repetitions, not the outcome of any single throw: the observed fraction \(N_A/N\) wanders around 1/6 and tends to close in on it as the number \(N\) of throws grows, without ever standing still.
With 600 throws per die, the expected number of sixes is 100 for a fair die and 200 for the loaded one. A fair die seldom strays from 100 by more than about 20, and the gap between 100 and 200 is wide enough for the histograms, which at first were hard to tell apart, to start telling different stories.
The bars at the bottom answer a different question, namely which of the three is loaded. Before the first throw all three sit at 1/3, because nothing sets one die apart from the others. After every throw the bench asks how likely the observed counts would be if each die in turn were the loaded one, and whichever die piles up extra sixes gains credit. In our simulations, with 10 throws per die the guess passes 95% in fewer than one draw in ten, and with 100 it passes in nearly all of them.
The dice do not change during the experiment, and yet the probability that B is the loaded one rises and falls with every click. This only seems odd while we think of probability as a property of the die. Feynman reads it differently: a probability measures what we are entitled to expect when what we know is incomplete, so it shifts whenever that knowledge shifts. The button that reveals the loaded die makes the point plain, since whoever presses it now assigns 1 to one die and 0 to the other two, although nothing whatsoever has happened to the dice.
In Feynman: §6-1 Chance and likelihood ↗
Let's discuss
- Throw 10 times, look at the guess and throw 10 more. Has the most suspicious die changed? Why does that not point to a fault in the bench?
- Swap the dice, throw 30 times and try to pick out the loaded one from the histograms alone, before looking at the bars at the bottom. Repeat a few times. How often do you get it right?
- With 600 throws per die, how many sixes do you expect from each? Check against the frequency of sixes in the statistics.
- Press “Show the loaded die”. Has the probability that A is loaded changed for you? And for someone who did not see the screen?